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MORE THOUGHTS ON THE PHYSICIAN'S
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN ABORTION
AND RELATED CHOICES
Susan Frelich Appleton*
A few years ago, I advanced the hypothesis that the true focus of the
Supreme Court's decisions protecting abortion has been the physician-
not the patient, the pregnant woman, nor the individual seeking to assert
what the Court calls "the right to privacy."' I explained how the Court's
preoccupation with medical standards in resolving constitutional ques-
tions about abortion2 and the Court's frequent portrayal of the physician
as the ultimate decisionmaker in every abortion choice3 create a tension
that peaks in judicial reviews of state efforts to regulate informed consent
to abortion.4
The informed-consent-to-abortion cases raise particularly troublesome
problems because, outside the abortion context, the informed consent
doctrine views physicians and patients as adversaries with separate and
distinct roles, interests, and agenda. This vision conflicts sharply with
the fusion of physician and patient depicted in current abortion jurispru-
dence. I concluded that a more coherent approach would address abor-
tion restrictions as a form of sex-based discrimination, or more precisely,
as laws that single out a class composed exclusively of female patients for
different and often paternalistic treatment.5 Under this approach, pro-
tection against inadequate disclosure by physicians to abortion patients
would come not from criminal statutes, but rather from the state's provi-
sion of a forum for malpractice suits, just as it does when the question of
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. A.B. 1970, Vassar College;
J.D. 1973, University of California, Berkeley.
This paper reworks a number of ideas that I originally presented at the Health Law Teachers'
Conference of the American Society of Law and Medicine, on June 3, 1988, in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania. Carol Napier (Washington University School of Law, class of 1991) provided both careful
and cooperative research assistance.
1. Appleton, Doctors, Patients, and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's
Role in "Private" Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 183 (1985).
2. See id. at 189-97.
3. See id. at 197-207. For a more recent discussion of this theme, see R. GOLDSTEIN,
MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION: A LEGAL INTERPRETATION 79-87 (1988).
4. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 207-26.
5. See id. at 226-35.
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informed consent arises in the context of medical treatment other than
abortion.6 This alternative approach would properly emphasize abortion
as a matter of profound and special importance for women. Further, it
would allow for relatively easy solutions to questions, such as informed
consent, that pose so many theoretical difficulties under the prevailing
doctor-dominated privacy analysis.
Now, some years later, I look again at the main idea of my earlier
work, that the physician is the real centerpiece of the Supreme Court's
abortion doctrine. This time I consider two particular questions: First,
have the courts continued to elevate the physician at the expense of the
abortion patient in the recent assessments of "informed consent" regula-
tions and in challenges to rules prohibiting abortion counseling, the new-
est restriction on the abortion patient's dialogue with her doctor?
Second, despite its other difficulties, how might the doctor-focused re-
gime contribute to an analysis of recent outgrowths of the abortion ques-
tion, including fetal tissue transplants (the subject of John Robertson's
and Nicholas Terry's papers7), "abortion pills," forced Caesarians and
other maternal-fetal conflicts, and modern reproductive technology?
I. REVISITING "INFORMED CONSENT" TO ABORTION: LAWS
MAKING THE PHYSICIAN THE STATE'S MOUTHPIECE OR
ITS SILENT PARTNER
When I examined the informed-consent issue earlier, the Supreme
Court's last word on the subject was City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.8 In this case the Court struck down a city
ordinance purporting to insure "fully informed [written] consent" to
abortion through three requirements. First, the ordinance required that
the attending physician orally inform the patient of the status of the "un-
born child" as a "human life from the moment of conception;" of the
"characteristics of the particular unborn child," including its "appear-
6. See id. at 233:
When the state singles out abortion patients or female birth-control patients for special
protection from their physicians by mandating waiting periods and detailed disclosure re-
quirements, the state perpetuates outmoded and pernicious stereotypes of woman as indeci-
sive and incompetent health-care consumers, incapable of obtaining necessary information
and time for reflection without paternalistic government intervention.
7. Robertson, Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 443 (1988); Terry, Politics and Pri-
vacy: Refining the Ethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 523
(1988).
8. 462 U.S. 416, 442-51 (1983).
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ance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain;" of the physical and
psychological risks of abortion; and of the availability of agencies provid-
ing assistance for birth control, adoption and childbirth.9 Second, the
ordinance required that the attending physician inform the patient of the
"particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion
technique to be employed," including instructions for appropriate post-
abortion care and "such other information which in [the physician's]
medical judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether to have an
abortion or carry her pregnancy to term."'" Third, the ordinance re-
quired that the physician wait twenty-four hours after the pregnant wo-
man signed the consent form before performing the abortion."
In overturning all three parts of this ordinance, the Akron majority
benefitted abortion patients, while further elevating the interests of physi-
cians. The first part of the ordinance fell not only because it was a
"parade of horribles" intended to discourage abortion 2 but also because
it intruded upon the physician's discretion.13 This invasion of physician
discretion, unaccompanied by any demonstrated legitimate state interest,
also invalidated the twenty-four hour waiting period.14 The second pro-
vision, however, violated the Constitution not because of the content of
the information to be communicated (which might advance patient
knowledge and hence meaningful choice), but rather because of its insis-
tence that the physician serve as the communicator.1 5 Ultimately, as I
have pointed out earlier, Akron teaches that the state may regulate what
the patient hears but not what the doctor says.1 6 Regardless of any bene-
fits to patients from the information required by the second part of the
ordinance, the physician must remain free of such state regulation. Even
if the majority's result allows women less costly abortions as well as the
opportunity to receive counseling from those better trained than physi-
cians to perform this function,' 7 the majority's reasoning still confirms
the preeminence of the physician in Court's analysis.
9. Id. at 442-44.
10. Id. at 446.
11. Id. at 449.
12. Id. at 445. See also Appleton, supra note 1, at 216 nn.233-34 (noting Court's consideration
of anti-abortion motives underlying this provision).
13. 462 U.S. at 445.
14. Id. at 450-51.
15. Id. at 448.
16. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 223-26.
17. See id. at 225.
19881
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Without reviewing Akron's allocation of decisionmaking authority for
abortions, the post-Akron literature on informed consent to all medical
treatment has continued to advocate increased self-determination for pa-
tients and comparatively less paternalism and control by physicians. Jay
Katz's, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient,18 published in 1984,
urges shared decisionmaking by doctor and patient as essential not only
for patient liberty,19 but also for effective therapy of any kind.20 Though
he does not mention abortion in particular, Katz explicitly rejects the
fusion of doctor and patient emerging from the Court's early analyses of
the abortion right21 when he emphasizes "[p]hysicians' and patients' sep-
arate identities" and the "existence of inevitable conflict" between
1hem.22
Along the same line, with respect to medical treatment in general,
Marjorie Maguire Shultz has persuasively pressed for recognition of pa-
tient choice as an expressly protected interest23 rather than as a by-prod-
uct of the law's protection of bodily security and bodily well-being. 24 As
Shultz sees this interest in patient choice and the physician's resulting
duty, the physician's "possession of information rather than [any] pro-
posed physical contact ... ought to occasion... disclosure" to the pa-
tient,25  who could then meaningfully participate in medical
decisionmaking. 26 Further, Shultz concedes that abortion and other con-
stitutional privacy cases about medical care fail to address the allocation
of authority between physician and patient,27 but argues that these cases
do stress individual autonomy and decisionmaking. 28 Given her conces-
18. J. KATz, M.D., THE SILENT WORLD OF DocTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
19. See id. at 84, 101-02.
20. See id. at 225.
21. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 197-204 (demonstrating how Court has depicted physician as
speaking for and deciding for abortion patient).
22. Katz writes:
The belief that doctors can act on behalf of patients denies the existence of inevitable con-
flict. Physicians' and patients' separate identities become obliterated. They collapse into
one identity and one single authoritative voice emerges-the physician's.... The authority
of the physician becomes virtually absolute.
J. Katz, supra note 18, at 99-100.
23. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J.
219 (1985).
24. Id. at 219.
25. Id. at 243, 246.
26. Id. at 247.
27. Id. at 277 n.243.
28. Id. at 277.
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sion, however, perhaps she means that these cases ought to emphasize
these values or that, even now, they use rhetoric purporting to do so.
Shultz then urges private law to follow by adopting a similar focus on
"intangible decisionmaking." 9
Recent case law outside the abortion context has begun to creep in this
same direction, although without achieving the velocity or the distance
sought by Katz or Shultz. For example, recognition of "the patient's
right of self-determination" recently persuaded New Jersey to join a
number of other jurisdictions that had abandoned the "professional"
standard for measuring a physician's duty to disclose information to a
patient in favor of a "prudent patient" rule.3" "The foundation for the
physician's duty to disclose in the first place is found in the idea that 'it is
the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself
the direction in which his interests seem to lie.' ",31
Despite the increasing prominence and clarity of patient autonomy in
tort law's informed-consent doctrine and the corollary disfavor of physi-
cian paternalism in this area,32 such values remain submerged and
clouded in constitutional challenges to "informed-consent" regulations
to abortion.33
In the most recent of such challenges to reach the Court, Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,34 a majority
struck down a Pennsylvania provision requiring the physician to commu-
29. Id.
30. Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 213, 540 A.2d 504, 509 (1988). Under the prudent
patient rule, a physician has a duty to disclose a risk "when a reasonable patient, in what the physi-
cian knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be 'likely to attach significance to the
risk or cluster of risks' in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy or to submit to it." Id. at
211-12, 540 A.2d at 508 (citation omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court lists the other jurisdic-
tions following the prudent patient rule first adopted in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). Largey, 110 N.J. at 212, 540 A.2d at 508.
Shultz would go further, proposing an individualized standard looking to whether a physician's
failure to disclose encroached upon the patient's own right to choose. Shultz, supra note 23, at 251.
31. 110 N.J. at 214, 540 A.2d at 509 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781).
32. See 110 N. J. at 214, 540 A.2d at 509; J. KATZ, supra note 18, at 110, 128; Shultz, supra
note 23, at 274-75. See also Appleton, supra note 1, at 221-22 & n.272 (criticizing possible paternal-
ism in constitutional opinions about reproductive health care).
33. In other words, I disagree with Maijorie Shultz's claims that "in this instance the public
law is somewhat in advance of the private" and that the "intangible decisionmaking focus of the
constitutional privacy interest presages the change in private law" proposed by Shultz. Shultz, supra
note 23, at 277.
34. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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nicate the following to the patient twenty-four hours before procuring
her consent to abortion:
(a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion, (b) the "fact
that there may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are
not accurately foreseeable," (c) the "particular medical risks associated
with the particular abortion procedure to be employed," (d) the probable
gestational age, and (e) the "medical risks associated with carrying her
child to term.",35
The statute also required that the woman be told, although not necessar-
ily by her physician, of the availability of medical assistance benefits for
pregnancy and childbirth, child support from the father, and printed
materials describing the fetus and state services providing help after
birth.36
Citing Akron, the Court invalidated the entire provision because of its
anti-abortion design and its invasion of physician discretion.3 7 Improv-
ing upon the unsatisfactory explanation offered in Akron,38 the Court in
Thornburgh tried to explain precisely why such statutes pose problems
from the perspective of the pregnant woman seeking to exercise her right
to reproductive choice: The statute unconstitutionally imposes upon
a woman "state medicine . . ., not the professional guidance she
seeks. . . ,39 According to the Court, such compelled information,
which might heighten patient anxiety' and which in some cases, say,
life-threatening pregnancies, would be cruel and destructive,4" "is the an-
tithesis of informed consent." 2 The majority opinion concludes with at
least partly revisionist language asserting that, all along, the privacy right
35. Id. at 760.
36. Id. at 760-61.
37. Id. at 762.
38. In Akron, the Court sought to show the impact on the woman by stating that the ordinance
placed "obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled to rely for advice in
connection with her decision." 462 U.S. at 445 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33
(1977)). It failed to explain, however, why such obstacles necessarily diminish rather than enhance
the patient's choice.
39. 476 U.S. at 763 (footnote omitted).
40. The Court noted that heightening the patient's anxiety would contravene "accepted medical
practice," id. at 762, in yet another reference to the physician-focused standard that controls these
cases. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 189-97.
41. 476 U.S. at 763.
42. Id. at 764. See also Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1574, 1634
(1987) (this part of majority's opinion in Thornburgh "appear[s] to illustrate an empathic under-
standing of the experience of women who have an unwanted-disastrous-pregnancy" in a way that
Roe and other cases had ignored).
[Vol. 66:499
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has belonged equally to women and men.4 3
Justice White's dissent, emphasizing the way in which the physician's
disclosure of information is ordinarily thought to enhance patient choice,
rejects the majority's conclusion that anxiety-producing or choice-influ-
encing disclosures undermine liberty.' Similarly, Justice O'Connor's
dissent, although conceding that disclosure requirements may interfere
with the first amendment rights of physicians, notes that all informed-
consent rules by their very purpose necessarily "intrude to some extent
on the physician's discretion to be the sole judge of what his or her pa-
tient needs to know." 45
In their appeal to patient self-determination all three opinions-the
majority's, Justice White's and Justice O'Connor's-obscure an impor-
tant point, which cannot be avoided once one confronts the even more
seriously flawed reasoning of then-Chief Justice Burger's dissent. This
opinion asks:
Can anyone doubt that the State could impose a similar [disclosure] re-
quirement with respect to other medical procedures? Can anyone doubt
that doctors routinely give similar information concerning risks in countless
procedures having far less impact on life and health, both physical and
emotional than an abortion, and risk a malpractice lawsuit if they fail to do
so?
..Can it possibly be that the Court is saying that the Constitution forbids
the communication of such critical information to a woman?
46
The answers are, of course, yes, the state could impose a similar disclo-
sure requirement on other medical procedures and, yes, doctors routinely
give similar information while risking malpractice suits for failure to do
so. (And certainly the Constitution does not forbid a doctor from com-
municating such information; indeed, a private physician's voluntary
communication to his patient entails no state action and hence violates
43. 476 U.S. at 772:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government....
That promise extends to women as well as men. Few decisions are more personal and
intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a
woman's decision-with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in
Roe-whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is funda-
mental. Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of the
sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.
44. 476 U.S. at 801 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
1988]
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no constitutional right of the patient.'7 ) But the point that gets lost in
these arguments is that, despite its power, the state does not regulate dis-
closure to other medical procedures in the same way or with the same
detail that it uses for abortion. Even in states that have codified the in-
formed-consent requirement, the statutes merely identify a standard of
care for judging claims of negligence in lawsuits brought by individual
patients.48 These statutes, which define informed consent in very general
terms,49 do not impose criminal penalties on non-complying physicians.50
The result, then, is that the state has singled out abortion patients-a
class composed entirely of women-as needing governmental supervision
of their receipt of information from their physicians. Such unique treat-
ment fosters a demeaning stereotype of women as incompetent health-
care consumers.
51
Failure to appreciate the unique way in which the state oversees abor-
tion patients has produced strange reasoning in the lower courts. For
example, relying on Thornburgh, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit recently invalidated an Illinois statute solely because
of its intrusion upon the discretion of the abortion patient's physician.2
This statute had in part prescribed the content of pre-abortion counsel-
ing53 and in part constrained such counseling by prohibiting any person
with a financial interest in the patient's decision from counseling her.54
47. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 212 and n.209. See also, eg., Planned Parenthood Ass'n-
Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (counseling by health-care prov-
iders "on their own" "involves no state action and cannot offend the Constitution"), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983).
48. See Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED.
163 (1984).
49. But see Appleton, supra note 1, at 233 n.366 (noting one exception: a civil statute singling
out breast cancer patients, who are virtually always female, for disclosure of "complete information
on all alternative treatments which are medically viable").
50. See generally, Andrews, supra note 48. By contrast, the Pennsylvania statute subjected the
physician to suspension or revocation of his license and others to criminal penalties. 476 U.S. at 759-
60. The notably different message that the state communicates when it makes "informed consent" to
abortion a matter of criminal law rather than simply providing a forum for a dissatisfied patient's
civil claim reveals why Thomas Jipping's recent analysis misses the mark. See Jipping, Informed
Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CAsE W. REs. 329 (1988). Cf id. at 377 (attempting to use a
malpractice case about informed consent to abortion to establish the validity of the statute struck
down in Thornburgh).
51. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 233-34 (elaborating on this argument).
52. Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 1372.
54. Id. at 1373. The statute also unconstitutionally required the physician who was to perform
the abortion to perform a pregnancy test. Id. at 1372.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/3
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Even more disturbing, given what women have at stake in such chal-
lenges to abortion regulations, is a district court opinion that takes the
Supreme Court's vision of doctor as decisionmaker to a new, although
not really surprising, extreme. 5 This court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a Missouri "informed consent" statute requiring, among other
things, the abortion patient to be informed "according to the best medi-
cal judgment of her attending physician whether she is or is not preg-
nant.",56 Among the reasons the court cited for the unconstitutionality of
this criminal provision was one specific way in which it invaded physi-
cian discretion. In the court's words, "it is clear that some physicians
believe that it is in the best health interest of many patients seeking abor-
tions not to be told definite results of pregnancy tests."57 Because the
court did not perceive the real vice in the statute-its suggestion that an
exclusively female class of patients cannot be trusted to elicit on their
own this important information from their doctors-the court embraced
a view of physicians as "protecting" their patients from the difficult
moral choice that abortion always presents. 8 Though I support the
court's result, holding the statute unconsitutional, I am troubled by the
court's explicit approval of patient ignorance and physician paternalism
and its diminution of meaningful personal choice.
Most courts have done a better job, I think, with laws that present the
mirror image of the forced-disclosure statutes. Instead of making the
physician the state's anti-abortion mouthpiece,59 these prohibited-disclo-
sure provisions impose upon the physician the role of silent partner in the
official campaign to minimize abortions. Such provisions, adopted by of-
ficials hoping to expand the constitutional protection the Supreme Court
afforded to funding allocations that exclude abortions," forbid abortion
55. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part on
other grounds, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (state did not appeal from district court's holding on
this part of statute), petition for appealfiled, 57 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1988) (No. 88-605).
56. 662 F. Supp. at 414.
57. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). Relying on Akron, the court also found unconstitutional the
provision's requirement that the attending physician apprise the woman of the statutorily listed facts.
Id. at 414, 416.
58. Despite its emphasis on physicians and medical standards, even the early abortion opinions
of the Supreme Court acknowledged that each abortion decision raises more than purely medical
questions. See Appleton, supra note 1, at 198-200 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)); see also Jipping, supra note 50, at 374 (contrasting Court's
differing definitions of "health" issues raised by each abortion choice).
59. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763 (informed-consent statute makes doctor "an agent of the
State").
60. See, e.g., Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1080 (8th Cir. 1988) (cit-
1988]
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counseling and referrals by physicians and other health-care workers re-
ceiving public support.61
Despite the argument that these are refusals to subsidize abortion
which do not impinge upon the right to privacy, 62 almost every court
that has considered such provisions on the merits has found them uncon-
stitutional.63  True, one court's constitutional analysis64 focuses almost
exclusively on the way in which these laws infringe the first amendment
rights of the physician or family planning service,65 and another court
ing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)). Cf. Bowen v.
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (Adolescent Family Life Act, which provides federal grants to
agencies, including religious organizations providing services related to teenage pregnancy, so long
as such services do not include family planning and the promotion of abortion, does not on its face
violate establishment clause of the first amendment).
61. See Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (challenging
Missouri statute prohibiting use of public funds or public facilities for purpose of performing, assist-
ing, encouraging or counseling abortions not necessary to save woman's life and prohibiting public
employees from performing, assisting, counseling or encouraging abortions not necessary to save
woman's life); Planned Parenthood of Cent. and N. Ariz. v. Ariz., 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.) (chal-
lenging footnote in appropriations bill forbidding state support of organizations that engage in abor-
tions and abortion-related services), aff'd sub nom. Babbitt v. Planned Parenthood of Cent. & N.
Ariz., 479 U.S. 926 (1986); State of N.Y. v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (challenging
federal regulations that prohibit encouraging, promoting, or advocating abortion and counseling and
referral for abortion by publicly funded family planning projects); Planned Parenthood Fed. of
America v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1988) (same), 687 F. Supp. 540 (granting permanent
injunction); Commonwealth of Mass. v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988) (same), appeal
docketed, No. 88-1279 (1st Cir. - , 1988); Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v.
Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (challenging statute that disqualifies state grant appli-
cants providing abortion counseling and referral services), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983), on remand, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Il1. 1983).
62. See generally Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the
Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981).
63. These measures were found unconstitutional in all of the cases listed supra, note 61, except
State of N.Y. v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261. See also Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government
Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. RaV. 1916, 1917
(1988) (arguing unconstitutionality of "the largest federal domestic program to date that restricts
speech about abortion").
64. The federal regulations have been held invalid on nonconstitutional grounds as well. See
680 F. Supp. at 1468-73 (regulations enacted without statutory authority), 687 F. Supp. 540 (grant-
ing summary judgment to plaintiffs challenging regulation and replacing preliminary injunction with
permanent injunction); 679 F. Supp. at 140-44 (regulations conflict with congressional intent). But
see 690 F. Supp. at 1265-72 (regulations do not offend controlling federal statute, do not violate
legislative intent with such clarity that they should be set aside, and are neither arbitrary nor
capricious).
65. See 679 F. Supp. at 144-47 (extended analysis of why federal regulations violate first amend-
ment rights of health-care providers followed by one paragraph noting impermissible burden on
privacy right of pregnant patients).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/3
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treats the "physician's crucial role" as an independent protected right.6 6
Further, the one court upholding such provisions overlooks the patient's
interests entirely by simply contrasting the prohibition of speech with the
failure to support it financially.67 Still, one can find reasoning in these
cases that effectively reveals what patients have at stake as well. While
the physician's first amendment rights include competently counseling
patients,68 the patient's first amendment rights include "the opportunity
to receive ... information."69 And a woman who cannot consult with
her physician about the abortion option cannot exercise her freedom of
choice.70
The statutes that prohibit abortion counseling or referrals present rela-
tively easy cases, however. Physician and patient share a single goal that
these laws inhibit: an opportunity for full disclosure. A successful chal-
lenge to these laws benefits both parties. Moreover, analyzed as issues of
sex-based discrimination, these laws clearly disadvantage an all-female
class of patients by singling out its members for an incomplete discussion
of their medical options. No other patients are similarly restricted in
their discussions with their health-care providers.71
66. See 680 F. Supp. at 1474-76 (court identifies regulations' intrusion into "physician's crucial
role" as a constitutional flaw "in addition" to their restriction of flow of information to pregnant
woman), 687 F. Supp. 540 (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and permanently enjoining
regulations).
67. See 690 F. Supp. at 1274 ("[The regulations] grant money to support one view and not
another; but that is quite different from infringing on free speech.").
68. 662 F. Supp. at 426, aff'd in part, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988); see 680 F. Supp. at 1476,
687 F. Supp. 540 (granting permanent injunction); cf. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l
Dev., 691 F. Supp. 394, 404-05 (D.D.C. 1988) (policy statement and implementing clause prohibit-
ing governmental funding of foreign family planning organizations "promoting abortion" and simi-
larly restricting subgrants from domestic organizations abridge freedom of speech). But see 690 F.
Supp. 1273 (funding given "only to those who support particular views does not violate consitutional
rights"); Planned Parenthood Ass'n-Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320, 324-25 (N.D.
11 1981) (grant ineligibility for organization that offers abortion counseling does not interfere with
organization's protected rights), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.
1983).
69. 662 F. Supp. at 426, aff'd in part, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988); 680 F. Supp. at 1476-78,
687 F. Supp. 540 (granting permanent injunction); 531 F. Supp. at 330-33, vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. 851 F.2d at 1080; 680 F. Supp. at 1476, 687 F. Supp 540 (granting permanent injunction);
662 F. Supp. at 427; see 679 F. Supp. at 147; 531 F. Supp. at 326-30, vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 700 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1983), after remand, 568 F. Supp. at 1496-99.
71. Although the state or federal government routinely bans or restricts the use, sale, or pre-
scription of certain drugs or devices, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977); People v.
Privitera, 23 Cal.3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979), I know
of no rule that prohibits the physician from counseling his patient on such matters-that is, discuss-
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By contrast, in the "informed-consent" or forced-disclosure cases the
statutes purport to guarantee the patient information that the physician
may have elected not to reveal.72 Physician's and patient's interests do
not merge so easily here. This potential conflict between doctor and pa-
tient, which is the core of the tort doctrine of informed consent and its
modern extensions, ought to trigger a separation of the patient's interests
in self-determination from the physician's interests in the unrestricted
practice of his profession. This separation would not only solidify abor-
tion doctrine, but would also clarify how to approach several new ques-
tions about human reproduction that do not directly concern abortion.
II. BEYOND ORDINARY ABORTION ISSUES
The constitutional protection that the Court has provided for abortion
generates a number of new questions in which the confusion about doc-
tors' and patients' interests becomes especially problematic. The discus-
sion that follows will not attempt to analyze fully these issues; rather it
will use them to illustrate the importance of the Court's failure to deline-
ate the appropriate spheres of physician and patient.
A. R U 486 and Future "'Abortion Pills"
New developments in abortion technology require a clearer identifica-
tion of the primary beneficiary of the Court's holdings. Abortion, as we
ing such subjects with his patient or answering a patient's questions thereon. Compare Young wo-
men's Christian Ass'n. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D. N.J. 1972) (pre-Roe criminal abortion
statute prohibited doctors from prescribing, advising or directing woman to take medication with
intent to cause abortion; even these laws did not criminalize discussion of abortion or answering
patient's questions thereon) with 680 F. Supp. at 1474 (under federal regulations "practitioners coun-
seling women on how to manage an unintended pregnancy will not be able to mention abortion"),
687 F. Supp. 540 (granting permanent injunction) and 851 F.2d at 1079 (ban on "encouraging or
counseling" abortion is unconstitutionally vague). In any event, abortion, unlike laetrile (the subject
of Privitera), is not an illegal treatment, and, of course, physicians who communicate false, erroneous
or misleading information to their patients may face civil or criminal liability. See, e.g., Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103 (1960) (physician may be civilly liable for affirmative
misrepresentation to patient); People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 578, 414 P.2d 353, 357, 51 Cal. Rptr.
225, 229 (1966) (grand theft), on remand, 270 Cal. App.2d 381, 75 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Dist. Ct. App.
1969)(second-degree murder), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970).
Theordore Hirt's recent attempt to defend abortion-counseling restrictions does not address the
unique, gender-specific operation of such laws. See Hirt, Why the Government Is Not Required to
Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1859 (1988).
72. Shultz approves a standard under which a physician's possession of "significant knowledge
about the medical condition of the patient," rather than a proposed physical contact with the pa-
tient, would trigger the duty to disclose. See Shultz, supra note 23, at 243.
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know it today, is a mechanical or surgical procedure that entails the di-
rect or active participation of the woman's physician.73 The development
of an "abortion pill," such as the currently experimental RU 486, which
acts as a progesterone antagonist to terminate early pregnancies, 74 fore-
tells a different vision in which the physician's involvement-for exam-
ple, writing a prescription-precedes the actual abortion, perhaps by a
significant interval.75
It is not difficult to imagine situations in which the physician might
play, at most, a minimal role. For example, after the physician consults
with and examines the patient, he prescribes an abortion pill, but after
filling the prescription the patient decides not to use the medication and
continues the pregnancy to term. Or this patient may use this pill to
terminate a subsequent pregnancy without consulting a physician about
this particular abortion. Finally, a physician might prescribe a substance
like RU 486 for a patient to use in the event of a subsequent late men-
strual period, without further physician consultation at the time the drug
is ingested,76 or to use regularly to prevent or interrupt unplanned
pregnancies. 77
As these hypothetical scenarios indicate, developments such as RU
486 allow increasing privatization of the abortion decision. These devel-
opments may not only shield the woman and her physician from the
73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Cahill,
'Abortion Pill' R U 486: Ethics, Rhetoric, and Social Practice, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.-Nov.
1987, at 5. Cf. Appleton, supra note 1, at 192 n.52 (noting menstrual extraction and other self-help
techniques).
74. Cahill, supra note 73; Cousinet, LeStrat, Ulmann, Baulieu, & Schaison, Termination of
Early Pregnancy by the Progesterone Antagonist R U486 (Mifepristone), 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1565
(1986). See also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 17 (RU 486, which "terminate[s] uterine receptiv-
ity," allows woman to assert her bodily integrity without invading bodily integrity of fetus); N.Y.
Times, October 30, 1988, at 1, col. I (RU 486, removed from French market because of pressure
from anti-abortion groups and ordered returned by French government, would face numerous obsta-
cles in U.S.).
75. Those conducting studies of RU 486, however, state: "The occurrence of failed abortions
[in 15 out of 100 subjects] and prolonged uterine bleeding in some subjects mandates that this drug
be used only under close medical supervision." Cousinet et al., supra note 74, at 1569. The subjects
in this study received oral doses of RU 486 as outpatients, with follow-up visits scheduled for days 4,
6, 9 and 13 and still later visits for some subjects. Id. at 1566.
76. Follow-up consultation may well be necessary. See supra note 75.
77. See Cahill, supra note 73, at 5, 8; Nieman, Choate, Chrousos, Healy, Morin, Renquist,
Merriam, Spitz, Bardin, Baulieu, & Loriaux, The Progesterone Antagonist R U 486: A Potential New
Contraceptive Agent, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 187, 190 (1987) (study concludes that RU 486 "holds
promise as a safe and effective form of fertility control that can be administered once a month").
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scrutiny that "surgical" abortion invites, 78 but may also insulate the wo-
man's choice from the direct and immediate involvement of the physi-
cian. Such abortion decisions increasingly resemble contraception,
conception, and continuation-of-pregnancy decisions in which the physi-
cian's participation, attenuated at best, often occurs well before or after
the fact.79 Only a constitutional framework premised on the independent
right of the woman, rather than on the physician's participation in each
abortion determination, can accommodate such developments.80
In addition, developments like RU 486 underscore the previously ex-
amined need for a coherent approach to informed consent to abortion,
under which tort remedies available to all, rather than gender-specific
state intervention, encourage appropriate communication between physi-
cian and patient.8" Whether a physician describes a drug like RU 486 to
his patient as a method of birth control or abortion (or as a method of
contraception or "contragestation" 2 ) may have a significant impact on
her decisionmaking process and her own moral resolutions.8 3  Such
choices ought to belong to her, free from the protective paternalism of
either her physician or the state,8 4 and the constitutional analysis ought
to reflect this goal.
B. Fetal Tissue Transplants
On June 20, 1988, Missouri became the first state to ban medical trans-
plantation of fetal tissue from abortions known to be procured for that
reason and abortions of fetuses known to be conceived for such pur-
78. Cahill, supra note 73, at 5.
79. In other words, although the physician may render medical assistance, as he does when he
prescribes oral contraceptives or provides prenatal care, his consultation with the woman ordinarily
occurs before or after she makes her decision to avoid conception or to conceive and carry to term.
80. The Court's habitual deference to accepted medical practice, see supra text accompanying
note 2, cannot resolve such issues any more than it could resolve challenges to, say, state regulation
of family size or state determination of the "right" time for a woman to conceive a child. Although
state interests in population control might enter such analysis, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 496-97 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), accepted medical practice would not be an issue.
81. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
82. See Cahill, supra note 73, at 7.
83. See id. See also Appleton, supra note 1, at 219-23 (considering requirement that physicians
prescribing "abortifacients" so inform their patients).
84. Cf supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (criticizing Reproductive Health Servs. v. Web-
ster, 662 F. Supp. 407,415 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd inpart on other grounds, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir.
1988)).
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poses.85 John Robertson, whose article explains fully the diseases that
fetal transplants may alleviate,86 reads Roe v. Wade to protect a decision
to abort to obtain fetal tissue for transplantation.87 He would conclude
that a law like Missouri's violates the Constitution because "state laws
that conditioned abortion on particular motivations would be invalid."88
I wonder whether the right recognized in Roe reaches so far. It is true
that Roe's protection of the abortion choice did not discriminate among
the reasons a woman might have for making this decision," even if Jus-
tice Douglas's concurrence identified this facet of the right to privacy
more explicitly than the majority's opinion.' ° The Roe majority did,
however, list a number of burdens or detriments that unwanted
85. On June 20, 1988, the following amendment to Chapter 188 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri was signed into law:
188.036. 1. No physician shall perform an abortion on a woman if the physician knows
that the woman conceived the unborn child for the purpose of providing fetal organs or
tissue for medical transplantation to herself or another, and the physician knows that the
woman intends to procure the abortion to utilize those organs or tissue for such use for
herself or another.
2. No person shall utilize the fetal organs or tissue resulting from an abortion for medi-
cal transplantation, if the person knows that the abortion was procured for the purpose of
utilizing those organs or tissue for such use.
3. No person shall offer any inducement, monetary or otherwise, to a woman or a
prospective father of an unborn child for the purpose of conceiving an unborn child for the
medical, scientific, experimental or therapeutic use of the fetal organs or tissue.
4. No person shall offer any inducement, monetary or otherwise, to the mother or
father of an unborn child for the purpose of procuring an abortion for the medical, scien-
tific, experimental or therapeutic use of the fetal organs or tissue.
5. No person shall knowingly offer or receive any valuable consideration for the fetal
organs or tissue resulting from an abortion, provided that nothing in this subsection shall
prohibit payment for burial or other final disposition of the fetal remains, or payment for a
pathological examination, autopsy or postmortem examination of the fetal remains.
6. If any provision in this section or the application thereof to any person, circum-
stance or period of gestation is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions or
applications which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this section are declared severable.
1988 Mo. Legis. Serv. - (Vernon).
A more extended review of this legislation appears in Terry, supra note 7, at 537-41.
86. See Robertson, supra note 7, at notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at text accompanying note 144.
89. See 410 U.S. at 153-54.
90. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in an opinion applicable to
Roe and Doe):
Georgia's [abortion] enactment has a constitutional infirmity because, as stated by the Dis-
trict Court, it "limits the number of reasons for which an abortion may be sought." I agree
with the holding of the District Court, "This the State may not do, because such action
unduly restricts a decision sheltered by the Constitutional right to privacy."
[citation omitted]
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pregnancies impose. 91 As one might expect, this 1973 list does not in-
clude any reference to the sorts of "detriments" that transplanting fetal
tissue to oneself or to another might alleviate. Yet to the extent that the
Missouri statute prohibits abortions that could relieve the burdens on
Roe's list, whatever their motiviation, 92 it violates the Constitution, ab-
sent a compelling state interest. On the other hand, to the extent that
such statutes might simply prohibit a certain reason for aborting (tissue
transplantation) while still allowing a woman to terminate the same preg-
nancy for other reasons (or for no particular reason at all),93 then I doubt
such statutes, though difficult to enforce, violate the constitutional right
to choose "whether or not to terminate [a] pregnancy."' 94 The woman
remains free to decide to terminate her pregnancy and to act on her
91. 410 U.S. at 153:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the wo-
man a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and phys-
ical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be
involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will
consider in consultation.
92. In other words, subsection 1 of the Missouri statute prohibits physicians from performing
abortions when certain conditions obtain; the statute does not exclusively address post.abortion dis-
position of fetal tissue. See supra note 85.
93. The Missouri statute allows tissue transplantation so long as the person "utilizing" the
tissue (presumably the physician performing the transplantation-or perhaps the recipient) does not
know that the abortion was procured for such purpose. Thus, the statute allows transplantation of
tissue from "family-planning abortions" and transplantation from abortions performed for trans-
plantation purposes so long as the woman conceals this reason from the "utilizer." See supra note
85.
94. 410 U.S. at 153. See id. (Court disagrees that woman is "entitled to terminate her preg-
nancy ...for whatever reason she alone chooses") (emphasis added). This statement probably
reflects the physician's crucial role in the Court's analysis rather than a limitation on the permissible
reasons for abortion.
As my student, Kathryn Case (Washington University School of Law, class of 1989), has pointed
out, in several other situations a woman may seek an "abortion" for reasons other than to avoid
pregnancy itself. See seminar paper on file with Washington University Law Quarterly. Consider, for
example, abortion of a fetus with chromosomal anomalies revealed by prenatal testing, followed by a
completed pregnancy of a "normal" fetus (see generally Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 656 (1979) (discussing "replacement" theory as method of measuring dam-
ages in wrongful life cases)), abortion of a fetus of the undesired gender, followed by a completed
pregnancy of a fetus of the desired gender (see, eg., Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Abortion Liberty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281 (1981)), or selective
abortion of one or more fetuses in a multiple-fetus pregnancy (see, eg., N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988,
§ 1 at 1, col. 6).
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decision.95
Similarly, if such statutes simply ban post-abortion transplantation,
but do not ban the abortions themselves, then the right articulated in Roe
would not be implicated.96 In other words, nothing in Roe suggests pro-
tection for a woman's ownership of the fetal tissue removed from her
uterus97 or her control over its disposition following the abortion.98 Rob-
95. Robertson's elaboration of the "subtle point," see Robertson, supra note 7, at 487 n.145,
underlying his conclusion is not convincing. First, the consequences of foregoing an abortion be-
cause the state has banned the pregnant woman's motive for aborting are vastly different from an
individual's decision to forego publication of protected material because the state has removed the
profit-motive. When a woman decides to bear a child because the state has outlawed tissue trans-
plantation, the one reason for which she would have terminated the pregnancy, the consequence is
palpable and life-altering; this woman must have chosen to bear the child-otherwise, she could
have obtained an abortion for other ("family planning") reasons. But the individual who, without
prospect of a profit, foregoes publication faces no such consequence and, indeed, may later recon-
sider. Cf Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (pluralilty opinion) (abortion decision cannot
be postponed). In short, the pregnant woman who does not abort and the would-be publisher are
not in parallel positions. Second, another comparison weakens Robertson's analogy. With respect
to another aspect of the fundamental right to privacy or liberty, divorce, see Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (due process guarantees access to courts for this "exclusive precondition
to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship"); see also Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 671-72 (1980) (suggesting no-fault divorce is constitutionally required),
states have long specified the grounds and have disallowed the exercise of the right for other "mo-
tives," even in the current no-fault era. Finally, it may well be that if Robertson's hypothetical law
directing the profits from certain speech to charity uncontitutionally burdens speech, it does so be-
cause such laws may result in the disappearance of certain speech from the market-to the detriment
of the first amendment rights of those who would read or hear such publications (recipients). Cf
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982) (New York's "Son of Sam" law directing to the victims
of a crime the profits that the criminal might earn from publications about his or her crime). This
extension of Robertson's analogy may reinforce the emphasis that he ultimately places on the fetal-
tissue recipient's constitutional rights. See Robertson, supra note 7, at notes 154-56 and accompany-
ing text.
96. See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill.) (ban on fetal research does not
infringe on fundamental right recognized in Roe), appeal dismissed sum nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439
U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). But see
Note, State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and the Fundamental Right to Privacy, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1073 (1988).
97. I agree with Robertson's conclusion that the "woman has no inherent right to dispose of
fetal tissue or designate the recipient." See Robertson, supra note 7, at 487 n. 145. But see id. at note
65 and accompanying text. Though the fetus is not a person, Roe, 410 U.S. at 158, and although it
depends on the woman's body for survival at least until viability, it has its own unique identity,
reflected in its own genetic structure, which differs from that of the woman. The fetus occupies her
body but is not part of it. The point is not that the woman therefore should lose all say about the
tissue disposition (compare how the next of kin may control the donation of eadaveric organs) but is
simply that the tissue is not "hers." Cf Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., no. BO 21195 (July
21, 1988) (because persons have property right in their bodily tissues, patient may sue for conversion
physician and others who, without patient's consent, used cells removed from his body to develop
profitable pharmaceuticals).
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ertson concedes this point when analyzing bans on the use of tissue ob-
tained for "family planning abortions" but reaches a different result for
bans on donor designation of the tissue recipient.99
This discussion overlooks two important points, however. First, in the
Supreme Court's informed-consent opinions, Akron and Thornburgh, ex-
amined earlier, the legislature's anti-abortion design played a "decisive"
role in invalidating the statute.1°° Prohibitions on the use of fetal tissue
or statutes like Missouri's-with its "unborn child" language,101 its in-
clusion in Missouri's criminal abortion restrictions,102 and its post-abor-
tion transplantation ban1° 3 -may well fall for this reason even if a
woman remains free to terminate her pregnancy and thereby to avoid all
98. The Court has held unconstitutional regulation of post-abortion disposition when the
vagueness of the statute failed to give fair warning to the physician. See City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451-52 (1983). This example, however, simply
supports my later point-that these issues are better considered as encroachments on the physician's
discretion rather than state invasions of the patient's privacy right. See infra note 109 and accompa-
nying text. In addition, the Court has upheld post-abortion record-keeping requirements, see
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976) ("no legally significant
impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient relationship"), and post-
abortion pathology test requirements that comport with accepted medical practice, see Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1983) (opinion of
Powell, J., announcing result supported by majority); similarly, states constitutionally can require
physicians to provide care for an infant born alive following an abortion, id. at 483-84, even if they
cannot require abortion methods that protect the fetus at the expense of maternal health, see, e.g.,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986).
In Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986), the court refused to decide whether a
Louisiana law requiring a physician to inform the patient after the abortion about the dispositional
alternatives for the fetus did or did not significantly burden or chill the patient's privacy right; the
court struck down the statute because it imposed the disclosure duty on the attending physician,
contrary to the rule announced in Akron. Id. at 997-98; see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text. This court also found Louisiana's ban on fetal experimentation unconstitutionally vague. Id. at
998-99. One can readily imagine, however, how a pre-abortion disclosure requirement concerning
post-abortion legal consequences might chill the right to choose abortion. Cf., e.g., Freiman v. Ash-
croft, 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978) (invalidating former Missouri statute requiring physician to
inform patient that live-born infant resulting from abortion automatically becomes ward of state),
aff'd, 440 U.S. 941 (1979); Leigh v. Olsen, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351 (D.N.D. 1980) (regulation
conditioning abortion on woman's selection for disposal of fetus directly and unreasonably burdens
abortion decision).
99. See Robertson, supra note 7, at notes 131-36 and accompanying text (bans on use of fetal
tissue); id. at notes 142-46 and accompanying text (bans on designation of donees).
100. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45.
101. See supra note 85.
102. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.075 (1986) (person knowingly violating any provisions of sec-
tions regulating abortion guilty of class A misdemeanor). See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.065 (1986)
(revocation of license for health personnel who willfully and knowingly violate such provisions).
103. See supra note 85.
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of the burdens listed in Roe. True, the state may through its statutes
"speak" in favor of respecting fetal life, as Robertson argues;"° but the
abortion-funding cases °5, which he notes, 10 6 together with the treatment
of anti-abortion design in Akron and Thornburgh, make plain that such
expressions of governmental value judgments will survive only when the
state fails to subsidize abortion (or fetal research), not when it actively
regulates or restricts abortion and thus evokes strict judicial scrutiny.107
To say that a statute is invalid because of its anti-abortion design, how-
ever, does not require one to identify precisely whose constitutional right,
physician's or patient's, the statute disturbs.1"8 This observation suggests
the second important point. Statutes like Missouri's, as well as narrower
measures directed solely at post-abortion disposition or transplanta-
tion, 1° necessarily interfere with the exercise of medical discretion and
the physician's professional judgment in the treatment of disease. The
pre-eminence of the doctor in the Court's constitutional analysis and the
Court's consistent deference to medical standards and discretion would
call for strict judicial scrutiny."0 And as Roe and subsequent cases es-
tablish, neither a state's moral objections to abortion"'I (or fetal tissue
transplantation) nor its health concerns that fail to mirror prevailing
practice 12 meet this test.
104. See Robertson, supra note 7, at text accompanying notes 135-36.
105. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
106. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 484 n.135.
107. In the funding cases, the Court determined that abortion is a negative right and that gov-
ernmental refusals to subsidize abortions evoke the rational-basis test, not the strict scrutiny applica-
ble to state-created obstacles to abortion. See Appleton, supra note 62. Cf H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (in applying less than strict scrutiny to parental notification requirement for
minors' abortions, Court says state may encourage childbirth).
108. Akron's examination of the two reasons for the invalidity of the forced-disclosure require-
ment might be read to suggest that a statute's anti-abortion design violates the patient's rights while
the intrusion upon the physician's discretion constitutes a separate flaw. See 462 U.S. at 444-45. But
if the Court has given physicians a protected interest in the exercise of medical discretion in abor-
tion, then a statute designed to have a negative impact on abortion practice would fail for that reason
as well.
109. See, eg., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1986) (Louisiana statute
prohibiting nontherapeutic fetal experimentation is unconstitutionally vague).
110. See, ag., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); see also
People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 730, 591 P.2d 919, 939, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 451 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) (compelling state interest test required for intrusions upon physician's right to administer
medical care), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
111. See, eg., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 771-72.
112. See, eg., Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-39.
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C. The Physician and Patient as Real Adversaries
The jurisprudence of reproduction has produced constitutional litiga-
tion in which the physician and patient are real adversaries. Doctrine
that treats these two parties as one or that defers to the doctor as a means
of protecting the patient's rights cannot satisfactorily resolve these cases.
1. Forced Caesareans and other Maternal-Fetal Conflicts
In a small but growing number of cases' 13 (examined in a much more
quickly growing body of scholarship1 14) physicians or other health care
113. See Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.) (upholding order granting hospital's application for permission to administer blood
transfusions to emergency patient, over her religious objections, because she was "hardly compos
mentis" and she was the mother of a young child), cerL denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re A.C., 533
A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (denying stay of court-ordered Caesarean section because 26-week-old fetus'
interests outweigh terminally ill and heavily sedated mother's right to bodily integrity), vacated for
reh'g en banc, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga.
86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (relying on Roe v. Wade, court refuses to stay order giving custody of
almost-full-term fetus to the state and requiring pregnant woman with complete placenta previa to
submit to sonogram and Caesarean section, despite her religious objections); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp., v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (authorizing, over patient's reli-
gious objections, blood transfusions necessary to preserve her life and that of her fetus after 32nd
week of pregnancy), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); but see Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446
N.E.2d 395 (1983) (vacating judgment in favor of husband who sought to compel wife, over her
religious objection, to submit to cervical sutures to prevent miscarriage of four-month pregnancy),
See also In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (fetus cannot be a dependent
child within juvenile court's jurisdiction); In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37
(1977) (fetus is not a neglected child within court's jurisdiction even after parental rights to older
child had been permanently terminated for abuse); People v. Stewart, No. M50819 (San Diego
County, Cal. Feb. 26, 1987) (dismissing prosecution for conduct during pregnancy, including drug
use and failure to follow prenatal medical advice, allegedly causing infant to be born brain-dead), as
cited by Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1951, 1963 n.79 (1986). Cf Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d
869 (1980) (summary judgment for mother whose prenatal ingestion of Tetracycline caused son to
have discolored teeth reversed; child may recover damages for injuries caused by mother's unreason-
able prenatal conduct); In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (mother's narcot-
ics ingestion during pregnancy makes newborn, who exhibited withdrawal symptoms after birth, a
neglected child warranting state intervention).
114. See Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987) (opposing forced intervention); Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal
Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L.J. 599 (1986) (opposing forced intervention); Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can
the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1984) (favoring limited forced intervention); Nelson, Buggy
& Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to
the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986) (opposing forced intervention); Rhoden, supra note 113
(opposing forced intervention); Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 333 (1982) (advocating forced intervention); Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of
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providers have challenged the reproductive choices of their pregnant pa-
tients by initiating intervention, purportedly on behalf of the fetus.
Whether the physician seeks judicial approval of a blood transfusion115, a
Caesarian section, 11 6 a prescribed diet or course of medication,1 17 or sur-
gery in utero, 118 the underlying issue remains the same: Should the wo-
man's interests in bodily integrity, autonomy, and privacy prevail over
the fetus's interests in life and health or the state's interests in fetal
protection?
No matter how one might prefer to resolve this difficult question, these
cases reveal the absurdity of the assumption that the physician shares the
interests of his patient in reproductive decisions. 19 Physicians who initi-
ate these cases ordinarily disagree with the woman's choice and seek a
court order to avoid a subsequent claim of battery or malpractice. Cer-
tainly these physicians are not the "rascals" that the Supreme Court ex-
cepts from its generalization of shared interests.120 Nor can we presume
that all of these physicians are pursuing results that their patients "re-
ally" want, whatever the patients' asserted objections. 21 The adversity
the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984) (advocating forced intervention and the availability of crimi-
nal sanctions and punitive damages for prenatal misconduct); Constitutional Limitations on State
Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1981) (allowing some forced intervention based
on a balancing of interests); The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for Judicial
Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065 (1983) (advocating forced intervention only for medically accepted
treatments that clearly benefit fetus and do not result in serious harm to mother). See also Beal,
"Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to her Child
Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325 (1984) (canvassing existing law with a view toward whether
mothers should be liable in tort for prenatal harm that they cause their children).
115. See, eg., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. An-
derson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert denied, 337 U.S. 985 (1964).
116. See, e.g., In re A.C. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (hospital sought order), reh'g granted en
banc, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988); Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981).
117. Cf., eg., People v. Pointer, 151 Cal.App. 3d 1128, 1141, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (1984)
(intensive prenatal treatment program would be less intrusive than prohibition of conception as con-
dition of probation for woman whose dietary practices had endangered children and would endanger
future fetuses).
118. See, e.g., Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 114, at 709-11.
119. Cf. Appleton, supra note 1, at 203-04 (Court says physicians speak for patients' interests).
120. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) ("The good physician--despite the pres-
ence of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that most physicians are 'good'-
will have sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by
those who participate in other areas of professional counseling."). See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 166
(intra-professional remedies for physicians who abuse exercise of medical judgment).
121. There is little more than speculation that these patients would prefer medical intervention if
only they could disclaim responsibility for choosing it. Cf C. FoOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER,
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between physician and patient is real and reveals the distortion worked in
the abortion opinions. If not, then it reveals the complete irrelevance of
the abortion cases for other questions of reproductive self-determination.
By contrast, examining these cases as problems of "samaritan law," in
which the issue becomes the patient's duty to aid her fetus in the face of
risks to her own autonomy and bodily integrity, reveals the otherwise
ignored questions of gender-based discrimination that any satisfactory
resolution must address.122
2. Access to Modern Reproductive Technology.
Still further from classic abortion questions, the increasing use of a
variety of noncoital methods of reproduction also creates potential adver-
sity between physician and patient. These noncoital methods include ar-
tificial insemination and in vitro fertilization, which can circumvent
problems of infertility and genetic disease. 123
California, for example, statutorily requires a physician to participate
in a woman's artificial insemination in order for certain legal protections
to apply. Specifically, without the physician's participation a woman is
not guaranteed the absence of all parental rights for the semen donor in
the resulting child.124 Other statutes also compel physician participation
in artificial insemination 125 even though the process can easily be accom-
plished without medical assistance. 126 In vitro fertilization, which does
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 491-92 (3d ed. 1985) (asking whether religious objectors
might really want medical treatment for their children). Put another way, the court cannot substi-
tute its judgment for that of a competent patient. Cf. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d
386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (using "doctrine of substituted judgment," court approves parental
consent to removal of kidney from healthy seven-year old daughter and transplantation to her
gravely ill identical twin).
122. See Rhoden, supra note 113, at 1976-82 (principles of samaritan law protect individual from
forced interventions to save another); see also Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1569 (1979) (rationalizing result in Roe v. Wade as protecting, under the equal-protection clause, a
woman's right to be a "bad Samaritan").
123. See generally L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS (1984).
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); see Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App.3d 386, 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986).
125. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1984) (felony for non-physician to artificially inseminate
a woman); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (1986) (inseminated woman's husband treated as
father of resulting child if insemination performed "under supervision of a licensed physician and
with the consent of her husband").
126. See, eg., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 391, 394, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532,
535 (1986) (self-insemination by nurse); C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 161, 377 A.2d 821, 821-
22 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977) (self-insemination using glass syringe and glass jar); Hornstein,
[Vol. 66:499
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/3
1988] PHYSICIAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE
require considerable medical assistance, necessarily involves physicians
or other health-care professionals in the reproductive process. 2 7
Given these facts, a state-employed physician 2 ' who refuses to assist,
say, a single woman seeking artificial insemination or in vitro fertiliza-
tion, because he will only provide such treatment for married women,
arguably inhibits her exercise of reproductive autonomy. 129 A successful
challenge by this woman requires at least13 that the right of privacy
elaborated in Roe (even if not first articulated there) belongs to her, not
to her physician.' 31 If, on the other hand, the Roe line of cases essen-
tially establishes a constitutional protection for the medical and moral
discretion of doctors, as I have suggested in the past, then the physician
must prevail in this challenge. In any event, an analysis that fuses physi-
cian's and patient's interests provides no help in resolving such instances
Children by Donor Insemination. A New Choice for Lesbians, in TEsT-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT Fu-
TURE FOR MOTHERHOOD 373, 375 (R. Arditti, R. Klein, & S. Minden eds. 1984) (turkey baster).
127. See Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157, 159 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (describing procedure
which requires, inter alia, surgical removal of ovum); L. Andrews, supra note 123, at 121 (same).
128. For example, a physician at a state medical facility, such as the state university's teaching
hospital or clinic, would fit this description.
129. Litigation based on precisely such facts was settled out of court in Michigan. See L. An-
drews, supra note 123, at 194-95 (single woman sued Wayne State University artificial insemination
clinic which restricted its services to married couples). See also id. at 194 (recommending that single
women seek services from state-affiliated clinic to permit reliance on constitutional right to privacy);
Kern & Ridolfi, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right to Be a Single Parent
Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 251 (1982) (examining argu-
ments supporting claim that barring single women from artificial insemination violates fundamental
rights to privacy and procreation); Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemi-
nation: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 26-28 (1981) (legis-
lation restricting artificial insemination to married women violates constitutional right of unmarried
women to choose pregnancy through artificial insemination); Note, Reproductive Technology and the
Reproductive Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985) (due process and equal protec-
tion clauses protect right of unmarried person to procreate through reproductive technology).
130. Even a successful assertion of her right to privacy would not guarantee the woman the
insemination she seeks, for no physician can be compelled to provide treatment against his judgment.
See McCabe v. Nassau County Med. Cen., 453 F.2d 698, 705-09 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing) (federal court cannot substitute its judicial judgment for physician's medical judgment when
woman asserts constitutional right to sterilization). Indeed, Lori Andrews's description of the Mich-
igan case, see supra note 129, concludes by noting that the litigation settled "with the university's
agreement to drop its marriage requirement and to consider the woman for its [insemination] pro-
gram." L. Andrews, supra note 123, at 195 (emphasis added).
131. This analysis assumes that Roe and related cases protect reproductive choices, not just
abortion, and that Roe's recognition of "artificial means" to terminate pregnancies supports protec-
tion of "artificial means" to initiate pregnancies. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(strict scrutiny of classifications infringing right to procreate); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave unconstitutionally penalizes protected decision to
bear a child).
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of true doctor-patient adversity. 132
III. CONCLUSION
Legal developments in the years since I last examined the physician's
role in private reproductive decisions have produced little substantive
change although the language of the Supreme Court's most recent opin-
ion acknowledges a woman's right to privacy in forceful terms. 133 Be-
cause these developments fail to recognize the sex-based discrimination
produced by all abortion-specific restrictions, the informed-consent cases
remain highly problematic. Though more satisfactorily resolved, the
prohibited-disclosure cases also fail to separate the distinct interests of
doctors and patients. Finally, new questions, growing out of the abortion
controversy but reaching well beyond our ordinary understanding of this
term, including questions raised by "abortion pills," fetal tissue trans-
plantation, failure to treat fetal disease or distress, and medically assisted
methods of noncoital reproduction, all underscore the need to identify
clearly in both substance and language the patient-the woman-as the
center of the analysis.
132. Again, the underlying problem may well be properly viewed as one of discrimination, here
based on marital status, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."), rather than on gender-notwithstanding the suggestion that the latter basis
is established by comparing the state's treatment of artificial insemination and surrogacy. See In re
Baby M., N.J. Super. 313, 388, 525 A.2d 1128, 1165 (1987), rev'd, 109 N.J. 306, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988). Even under this questionable approach, one could find gender-based discrimination only if
the hypothesized state-sponsored physician assisted single men wishing to reproduce via "surrogate
mothers" while refusing to assist single women seeking to bear children for themselves via artificial
insemination or in vitro fertilization.
133. See supra note 43 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)); Henderson, supra note 42, at 1634.
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